Uncalculated Risk
In the Western discourse, it seems that Israel has more room for action and greater responsibility than Hamas. Israel is the stronger side. Israel is more sophisticated. Israel has more options and possibilities available to it. However, when observing events, Israel appears trapped. Its course of action is narrow and limited. It simply has to do things that logic dictates. There will be no discussion where the cabinet will weigh the pros and cons of different actions and decide to opt for a problematic one. In other words, Israel is stuck in the mold of rationality, while Hamas was able to break out of this mold with an ostensibly irrational and wild attack. This is reminiscent of the Biden administration's apathetic response to Iranian aggression, compared to Trump's abrupt and exaggerated decision to simply eliminate Qassem Soleimani. Hamas, like Trump, thus has more room for action than Israel. It simply isn't constrained by rationality. Its strategy is that of a mad player. But when examined deeply, one understands it's a strategy that could work. It increases the odds and risks but also sets an exciting horizon for Hamas. It could lead to the destruction of Hamas, but under certain circumstances, it could also lead to Hamas' success and the weakening of Israel to the point of annihilation. Only from the perspective of continuously trying to minimize risks does Hamas' action seem absurd. For Bibi Netanyahu, whose hallmark is risk minimization, this is irrational behavior. For Yahya Sinwar, who chose a life that led him to life imprisonment in an Israeli jail and to personally kill collaborators with his own hands, it's rational. High risk, high reward.
Even successful and wealthy nations can choose the strategy of a mad player. The United States' willingness to choose Donald Trump is an example of this. Of course, there's the example of Germany in the 1930s. Russia under Putin also went this route, but likely based on entirely erroneous assumptions about reality. However, nations that feel utterly defeated will undoubtedly gravitate towards such a choice. A sense of humiliation will make them feel they have nothing to lose. The existence of Palestine alongside Israel is rooted in a feeling of defeat and loss, the loss of cities like Haifa, Jaffa, Lod, and more. We must then expect that the natural choice of Palestinian nationalism will always be that of a gambler - one that steps outside of minor and immediate cost-benefit calculations and is ready to cause widespread destruction in order to entirely change the equation, hoping that this time the dice will roll in his favor.
In a way, this contrasts with Ze'ev Jabotinsky's "Iron Wall" doctrine. Even in the face of Israel's overwhelming advantage, the Palestinians will still not agree to act rationally. Achieving peace with the Palestinians is possible in only one of two ways. The tiring and easy way is continuous control over them, as Israel controls the Arabs of Israel and, to a lesser extent, the Arabs of the West Bank. If we were to allow these groups to fully self-organize without the fear of the Shin Bet, the police, and the army, it's likely, perhaps even certain, that both would be ruled by their own version of a Sinwar-led organization.
The hard way to achieve peace with the Palestinians is to ensure their reintegration into Arab nationalism. There are no cultural, linguistic, or religious differences that justify the existence of a separate Palestinian people, and those individuals who identify as Palestinian can feel a sense of belonging to another Arab nation, if that Arab nation has an interest in assimilating them into its fold.